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Dr. Paul Wolfowitz became the twenty-eighth Deputy
Secretary of Defense on 2 March 2001. For the previous
seven years, he was dean and professor of international
relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. From
1989 to 1993, Dr. Wolfowitz served as Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy with major responsibilities for the
reshaping of strategy and force posture at the end of the
Cold War. For three years during the Reagan adminis-
tration, he was U.S. ambassador to Indonesia. Prior to
that posting, Dr. Wolfowitz’s government service also in-
cluded tours as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, head of the State Department’s Policy
Planning Staff, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Regional Programs, in the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, and as a management intern at the Bureau
of the Budget.
Dr. Wolfowitz received a bachelor of science degree from
Cornell University in mathematics and a doctorate in
political science from the University of Chicago, and has
taught at Yale and Johns Hopkins. In 1993 he was the
George F. Kennan Professor of National Security Strategy
at the National War College. He has written widely on the
subject of national strategy and foreign policy and has
been a member of numerous advisory boards, including
those of the journals Foreign Affairs and National
Interest.
These remarks were delivered in Newport to the Naval
War College graduating class on 20 June 2003.
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“THE GREATEST DEEDS ARE YET TO BE DONE”
The Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
It is customary in commencement speeches to say something about the dynamicworld that graduates are about to enter and how that change is going to affect
their lives. But that traditional message does not work on this occasion, with this
audience. You are graduating, but you are certainly not commencing. “To com-
mence,” after all, is “to begin.” When you return to your fleet or to your units you
will not be beginning a brand-new career. You will be going back to the noble
profession to which you have chosen to dedicate your lives. But you will be going
back enriched by what you have learned here and by what you will continue to
learn with the tools that you have acquired here.
There have been dramatic changes in the world during your year at the Naval
War College, particularly in the world of the military. You will be going back to
operational assignments having had a chance to study those developments from
a critical perspective. Your study here has prepared you to bring fresh ideas to the
dynamic process of innovation that is under way in our military today.
One of the most significant elements that you observed was the battle of Iraq.
I expect that, like the rest of the country, you were glued to televisions for much
of March and April. The battlefield—or what we should more correctly call “the
battle space”—is the ultimate classroom for your profession, and we are still
learning the lessons from those crucial weeks. But some of those lessons are al-
ready obvious, and they indicate lasting changes in the way the U.S. armed forces
will operate in the future.
Some of the changes that led to these lessons have been in the works for quite
a long time. I am sure that many of you have contributed to those changes. But in
the last year the whole world has had a chance—thanks in part to yet another
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innovation, the concept of embedded reporters—to see what they are, and the
effect has been dramatic.
The first has been the application of new networking and communications
technologies, which have taken the integration of air and ground forces to an en-
tirely new level and have given our soldiers and Marines on the ground nearly
instantaneous access to precision air support. The presence of those brave sol-
diers and Marines in turn enabled our long-range striking power to find targets
with precision. That too represents a quantum leap. Precision weapons are only
good if you have precision targeting; we can now combine the two in dramatic
new ways.
That new capability, in turn, enabled our ground forces to advance at an as-
tonishing speed over distances far exceeding those of DESERT STORM. It also
made possible the use of Special Forces on a scale that would have been difficult
to conceive of in the past. More than a hundred Special Forces “A teams” were
deployed throughout Iraq in this conflict. That in turn led to the disappearance
of a “front” in the traditional sense, to be replaced by the concept of battle space.
We also saw some remarkable organizational innovations. Who would have
imagined a conventional tank unit under the command of a Special Forces lieu-
tenant colonel? Or the first-ever combined forces land component commander,
integrating Army, Marine Corps, and coalition forces in a single, brilliant land
combat campaign?
We saw revolutionary application of new technologies, such as unmanned
aerial vehicles and hit-to-kill antimissile systems. So the question is not whether
you in the audience today will adapt to these changes. I have no doubt that you
will. You are professionals. The real question is whether the organizations that
we work in will adapt as well.
But adapt they must. The world has changed, both technologically and politi-
cally. The armed forces that many of you joined were organized to fight an en-
emy that no longer exists, along boundaries that were fixed and identifiable. Our
enemy today does not have those attributes. He is elusive and often invisible. He
uses unconventional weapons against unconventional targets, including the
American heartland. The conflict is, in a word, asymmetric, and we must be able
to respond in kind.
The battle in Iraq—like the battle in Afghanistan before it—is a dramatic vic-
tory in the war on terrorism. In the last year there have also been important si-
lent victories, achieved by extraordinary international cooperation among
intelligence, law enforcement, and military authorities of dozens of countries.
These combined efforts have killed and captured terrorists, among them the
mastermind of the 11 September attacks, Khalid Shaykh Mohammad. But these
victories are just battles in the larger war on terrorism. As President Bush said in
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announcing the end of major combat operations in Iraq, “The battle of Iraq is
one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11th, 2001—and still
goes on.”
Our purpose is not to “manage” terrorism or simply to arrest and prosecute
terrorists after they have attacked us. Our goal is to destroy and delegitimize ter-
rorism the way slavery and piracy were delegitimized in the nineteenth century.
The global war on terrorism needs to be understood as a two-front war. The
first and most obvious front is the effort to kill and capture terrorists and to dis-
mantle terrorist networks. That is not just a military operation; it is an effort that
requires all the instruments of national power, including intelligence, law en-
forcement, and diplomacy. We are making important headway every single day.
The enemy is on the run. We are destroying his bases of operation, his organiza-
tion, his sources of funds, his ability to move and communicate, and his ability
to strike. That is the first front in the war on terrorism. In the command and staff
positions you will be assuming shortly, you will be on the front lines of that war.
Let there be no doubt, we will win this war.
As the president has said, “We do not know the day of final victory but we
have seen the turning of the tide. No act of the terrorists will change our pur-
pose, or weaken our resolve, or alter their fate. Their cause is lost. Free nations
will press on to victory.” We will win in part because our military is the
best-equipped, best-trained, best-led fighting force on earth, and we have the
support of dozens of other freedom-loving nations that are part of our coali-
tion—many of them represented here today. When we engage militarily, the out-
come is certain.
But there is a second front in the global war on terror—the challenge to build
what President Bush has called “a just and peaceful world beyond the war on
terror,” particularly in the Muslim world. That means helping a liberated Iraq to
become the free and democratic country that it can be. It means resolving the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Winning the peace is an even greater challenge than winning
the war.
But even as the war on terrorism continues to consume our time and atten-
tion, it is vital that we also continue transformation, the initial effects of which
were demonstrated so dramatically in the battle in Iraq. We need to sustain that
effort not only to win the war on terror but to deter the wars of the future, or if
necessary, fight them successfully. The American military has an extraordinary
history of innovation in time of war. Some might even say that we are more in-
novative under the stress of war than in the leisure of peace. We should use the
urgency of the present war on terror to continue transforming our military not
only to win this war but to be prepared to win, or—even better, to prevent—the
next one.
W O L F O W I T Z 1 5
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Needless to say, transformation means profound change. Not only techno-
logical change. Not even primarily technological change. The changes enabled
by new networking and information technology take the potential of joint oper-
ations to a dramatically new and unprecedented level. And that is more than a
mechanical change. It requires a change in the way we think and the way we or-
ganize. It is properly described as a cultural change. If we are going to depend on
one another in wartime, we must forge the bonds of trust in peacetime. That
means our training has to become increasingly joint as well.
With that thought in mind, we are developing a joint national training capa-
bility to create a distributed, global environment in which individuals and units
will receive training and experience in joint operations at the strategic, opera-
tional, and tactical levels. It should include a live training component that con-
nects live training exercises and allows the best practices to circulate among
the services. It should also include a virtual capability to link service training
centers. We want to increase the amount of joint field training that our forces
receive, because we need to train like we fight, as a coherently integrated team.
All of that requires what Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has called a cul-
ture of “innovation and intelligent risk taking.”
Someone once remarked on the huge number of failures that Thomas Alva
Edison had suffered in his efforts to develop a new battery. “Some fifty thousand
failed experiments,” this observer said, “with no results.” “Results?” Edison replied.
“Why, I’ve gotten a lot of results. I know fifty thousand things that don’t work.”
I am sure I do not need to tell this audience that military organizations, for all
of their outstanding attributes, are not always the most welcoming of change.
That great American inventor Robert Fulton, best known for his invention of a
successful steamboat, was contracted by a foreign government to try to build a
submarine. After an embarrassing trial of the design he produced, an admiral
from that foreign navy snorted, “Thank God we still fight our battles above the
waves and not beneath them.”
Well, we have to be prepared for change. In the interest of jointness let me tell
a story on the Army—our Army. It is a story of an infantry officer who, here in
the United States in the 1930s, began to write about the future of armored war-
fare. Instead of receiving support, he was chastised by his commander, who told
him that if he published anything that was contrary to what was called “solid in-
fantry doctrine,” he would be court-martialed. That soldier so interested in the
future of armored warfare who was so nearly retired as a colonel was Dwight David
Eisenhower. It took the intervention of General John J. Pershing’s chief of staff to
save his career.
The rest, as they say, is history.
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In one sense, of course, the successful organization is right to question too
much innovation. There is an old proverb that says, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”
Given the high stakes that attach to military decisions, there are good reasons to
be conservative about risk taking. But there is another side to the same story.
Professor Clayton Christensen of the Harvard Business School has pointed out
in his book The Innovator’s Dilemma that the most successful companies—the
ones that seem to have done everything right—have been the most vulnerable
when disruptive innovations come along. As he put it, “The very decision-
making and resource-allocation processes that are key to the success of estab-
lished companies are the very processes that reject disruptive technologies.”*
Today one of our fundamental challenges is to encourage prospective
Eisenhowers, to inspire each of you to think about the war of the future. During
my present tour at the Pentagon, I have been privileged to know some remark-
able innovators—and I am sure there are many in this audience today as well.
The commander of Central Command, General Tommy Franks, is a great exam-
ple. In Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, for example, Special
Forces on the ground took nineteenth-century horse cavalry, combined it with
fifty-year-old B-52 bombers, and, using modern satellite communications, pro-
duced a truly twenty-first-century capability. When Secretary Rumsfeld was
asked what he had in mind by reintroducing the horse cavalry into modern war-
fare he replied, with a big grin, “It’s all part of our transformation plan.”
As I am sure you are all aware, the Naval War College has been one of the great
generators of innovation for the U.S. military. During the period before World
War II, naval officers here first thought about the concept of mass carrier opera-
tions. It was here that Plan ORANGE—the prophetic concept of operations for a
war against Japan—was developed, long before Pearl Harbor. More recently, un-
der the leadership of Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, this college developed
the concept of network-centric warfare. At the same time this institution main-
tains a curriculum that is traditional in substance, with a focus on the Great
Books and history. Some of you probably say it had too much history, because
you had to struggle with it. But that combination of innovative and classical
thought has enabled the Naval War College to produce military leaders who har-
ness an understanding of the past and the potential of technological progress to
produce new ideas for the future.
So as you graduate you will take with you what is in effect a liberal education in
the military art. The capacity for independent, critical thought and reflection and
the ability to question assumptions and previous modes of warfare will give you an
advantage over your adversaries in an age of great uncertainty and rapid change.
W O L F O W I T Z 1 7
* Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail,
Management of Innovation and Change Series (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997).
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That classical education does several things. For one, it imparts a healthy
skepticism about pat answers or easy solutions. It should make you wary about
received wisdom. Second, it exposes students to a tremendous variety of experi-
ence. As someone once said, “History has more imagination than any scenario
writer in the Pentagon.” In the summer of 2001, who would have dared to pre-
dict that by the end of the year Americans would have been viciously attacked on
their own shores by an enemy without any capital, without any conventional
military force? Who could have predicted that within weeks of that attack Amer-
ica would be at war in landlocked Afghanistan? Or who would have dared to pre-
dict that by the time the last fires of the World Trade Center were extinguished,
U.S. forces would already be in Kabul?
Third, a classical education makes one think differently. It prepares one to
continue self-education. It makes one more intellectually adaptable as circum-
stances change and one confronts surprise. While technology confers many ad-
vantages, it cannot synthesize the value of interpersonal debate and discussion.
There is simply no substitute for face-to-face learning and interaction between
students and faculty, and among students themselves. Keep in touch with your
classmates after you leave. You will cross paths again, and you can continue to
learn from one another.
Education, as opposed to training, teaches us that clichés about war—like the
three-to-one rule for offense—have fallen by the wayside. Unorthodox battle
plans, such as those employed in Afghanistan or in Iraq, cannot be found in any
textbook or manual. They were produced by military leaders who grasped the
lessons of military history and applied them in entirely new circumstances.
Let me mention just one example. In preparing for the urban offensive on
Baghdad, one that many predicted would result in horrendous loss of life, Gen-
eral Franks and his staff developed a brilliant plan that was informed by the les-
sons of the Russian military experience in Grozny, the capital city of Chechnya.
But rather than simply accepting the superficial lesson that urban operations
can defeat advancing conventional armies and therefore should be avoided, they
applied a critical thought process to discern a fundamental difference about
Baghdad—a city with people awaiting liberation and blessed with wide boule-
vards. That was an important distinction from Grozny that could easily have
been missed. No manual could tell you that. It proves that education is not the
same thing as training.
We have entered a period in which discrepancies between militaries are far
greater than at any time in the recent past. The world of homogeneous armed
forces that fought the same way with the same weapons is a recent development.
Asymmetric warfare is not a new phenomenon. It is the story of our own na-
tional military history—of Continental Army forces firing from behind trees
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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and wearing down a numerically superior, better trained, and better equipped
British force.
Whatever conflicts lie ahead, you can be sure they will be as different from
Iraq as Iraq was from Afghanistan—as Afghanistan was from Kosovo—as
Kosovo was from DESERT STORM—as DESERT STORM was from JUST CAUSE.
Meeting the challenges of the future will require continuous questioning of ac-
cepted truths, a constant pursuit of lessons from history and of lessons from
technology that may have relevance to the contemporary situation. Because of
the premium we place on innovation, we require a joint officer corps that has
studied not only the technique of its profession but the very logic of war as an in-
strument of policy; we require a joint officer corps that is not afraid to ask ques-
tions or to offer answers that seem to violate bureaucratic norms and
conventional wisdom.
It is no accident that the commanders in Iraq include distinguished graduates
of this institution. They include a former commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Ad-
miral Robert Natter, who won the college’s Distinguished Graduate Leadership
Award in 2000. They include a former Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
William Fallon; the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral Charles
Moore; and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Readiness and Logistics,
Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn, who recently retired. It is a long list.
It has been said that this college made its greatest contribution to winning the
present war ten or fifteen years ago, when it educated the men and women who
are now taking the fight to the enemy. You will be following in their footsteps.
You have been preparing for what we expect will be senior leadership responsi-
bilities. That is the sole purpose of this institution. In the twenty-first century we
need leaders who can both think creatively and carry out orders.
Charles William Elliott had a distinguished career over forty years as president
of Harvard. When he was retiring in the early part of the last century, he was
treated to a dinner by his faculty. The Harvard faculty fell all over themselves offer-
ing praise, one after the other, for the retiring president. One finally said, “Presi-
dent Elliott, during your tenure here, Harvard has become a veritable storehouse
of knowledge.”Elliott replied, “What you say is true, but I can claim little credit for
it. It is simply that the freshmen bring so much and the seniors take so little away.”
You have brought much to this institution, but I am pretty certain you are also
taking a great deal away. So I want to congratulate you, wish you best of luck as
you continue your careers, and in closing leave you with the words of President
Theodore Roosevelt, who walked these very grounds near the turn of the last
century. A man of great vision and courage, Roosevelt said, “We see across the
dangers of the great future, and we rejoice as a giant refreshed. The great victo-
ries are yet to be won, the greatest deeds yet to be done.”
W O L F O W I T Z 1 9
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